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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
SIMMONS V. STATE: MANIFEST NECESSITY EXISTED TO
GRANT A MISTRIAL WHERE PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS
REGARDING A LIE DETECTOR TEST COULD NOT BE
CURED WITH AN IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTION; DOUBLE
JEOPARDY DID NOT BAR A RETRIAL.

By: Brittany N. Hampton
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when granting a mistrial after defense counsel gave an
improper opening statement, even though the prosecution did not move for a
mistrial until two days later. Simmons v. State, 436 Md. 202, 81 A.3d 383
(2013). Specifically, the court noted that because defense counsel knew or
should have known of the impropriety of mentioning the defendant's request
to take a polygraph test, the trial court was correctly concerned about the
prejudice the State would suffer as a result. Id. at 216, 81 A.3d at 391.
Further, the improper statement created the manifest necessity for a retrial,
thus avoiding double jeopardy. Id. at 213-14, 81 A.3d at 389-90.
On July 1, 2009, Stephen Simmons ("Simmons") was arrested and
interrogated in connection with a murder. During the interrogation,
Simmons offered to take a lie detector test; however, no such test was ever
performed. Simmons was charged with murder and other related charges in
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. During opening statements,
defense counsel referenced that Simmons offered to take a lie detector test.
After the State objected, the trial judge offered a curative instruction to the
jury. Two days later, after the court excluded the State's firearms expert's
testimony, the State moved for a mistrial claiming that the reference to the lie
detector test had prejudiced the jury so significantly that the State was
deprived of a fair trial.
The trial judge granted a mistrial as a matter of manifest necessity, stating
that the State's objection was timely and the court's curative instruction was
only a quick blurt, in an effort to cure the transgression. Simmons filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that double jeopardy prohibited a retrial;
the trial court, however, denied this motion. On appeal, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court, concluding that the trial court
judge did not abuse his discretion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to answer whether manifest necessity existed to justify
declaring a mistrial.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first determined that the appropriate
standard of review was abuse of discretion. Simmons, 436 Md. at 211-12,81
A.3d at 389. The court explained that when a judge's action was clearly
unreasonable, or was on untenable grounds or reasons, it was an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 212, 81 A.3d at 389 (citing Stabb v. State, 423 Md. 454,
223

224

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 44.2

465,31 A.3d 922,928 (2011)).
The court next addressed the Double Jeopardy clause of the United States
Constitution, in accordance with Maryland common law, which states that
generally no individual may be prosecuted for the same offense more than
once. Simmons, 446 Md. at 213,81 A.3d at 389-90 (citing State v. Woodson,
338 Md. 322, 328, 658 A.2d 272, 276 (1995)). In a jury trial, double
jeopardy usually prohibits retrying a criminal defendant for the same offense
after a jury has been empaneled and sworn; however, double jeopardy does
not bar all retrials per se. Simmons, 446 Md. at 213,81 A.3d at 389-90. The
court stated that a retrial can be permitted over a defendant's objection when
there is manifest necessity to prevent prejudice from depriving a party the
right to a fair trial. Id. at 213, 219, 81 A.3d at 390, 393. Manifest necessity
refers to the prosecution's heavy burden and "high degree" of necessity
required in declaring a mistrial. Id. at 214-15,81 A.3d at 290 (citing Arizona
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978)). The court further explained that
manifest necessity is determined based on the facts and circumstances of
each case and is left to the trial judge's discretion, which is afforded the
highest degree of respect. !d. at 214, 216, 81 A.3d at 390, 392 (citing
Washington, 434 U.S. at 506). The court noted that to meet this high degree
of necessity, the trial judge should explore all reasonable alternatives before
concluding that there is no option available other than to declare a mistrial.
Simmons, 436 Md. at 215,81 A.3d at 391 (citing Hubbard v. State, 395 Md.
73,92,909 A.2d 270, 281 (2006)).
The court pointed out that in some instances where inadmissible evidence
was presented or a prejudicial statement was made, the judge may issue a
curative instruction; a curative instruction, however, would be only
appropriate where it may cure the prejudice, rather than simply highlight the
prejudicial evidence or remark. Simmons, 436 Md. at 216, 219, 81 A.3d at
392-393 (citing Carter v. State, 366 Md. 574, 592, 785 A.2d 348, 358
(2001)). The court noted that trial judges must weigh prejudice caused by an
improper statement against a curative instruction's effectiveness to determine
whether the prejudice was significant enough to deprive a party of the right
to a fair trial, such that a curative instruction would not be a reasonable
alternative and a mistrial would not necessary. Simmons, 436 Md. at 219,81
A.3d at 393 (citing Washington, 434 U.S at 513).
When evaluating the severity of bias caused by an improper reference to a
lie detector test, the court explained that several factors were considered,
including how many times the reference was made, who solicited the
statement, whether credibility was an essential issue, the amount of other
evidence available, and whether an inference as to the result of the test could
be drawn. Simmons, 436 Md. at 220-21, 81 A.3d at 394 (citing Guesfeird,
300 Md. at 659, 480 A.2d at 803). Taken together, the factors determine
whether prejUdice caused by an improper statement regarding a lie detector
test was substantial enough to deny a party a fair trial. Simmons, 436 Md. at
221, 81 A.3d at 394 (citing Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 594, 560 A.2d
1137, 1141 (1989)).
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The court noted that in Simmons' case, the trial judge had determined that
the degree of prejudice incurred by the opening statement was so significant
that there was no reasonable alternative available other than to declare a
mistrial. Simmons, 436 Md. at 221-22, 81 A.3d at 394-95. The court
highlighted that the trial judge discussed the powerful setting of an opening
statement and acknowledged that the statement was made by defense
counsel, effectively reinforcing the defendant's testimony and credibility. Id.
The court also found that the trial judge evaluated the efficiency of the
curative instruction given to the jury and determined that it was not enough
to cure the significant prejudice caused by the defense counsel's opening
statement. Id. at 223,81 A.3d at 395. The court concluded that as there was
no reasonable alternative available, the trial judge found a manifest necessity
in declaring a mistrial; thus, the principle of double jeopardy was not
applicable. Id. at 216,223,81 A.3d at 392, 395.
The court concluded that there was no obligation for a trial judge to
declare a mistrial sua sponte, eventhough there was a two-day delay between
the improper remark during defense counsel's opening statement and the
State's request for a mistrial. Simmons, 436 Md. at 223, 81 A.3d at 396.
Further, the State's delay in not requesting a mistrial, until after its expert
witness testimony was excluded, was not evidence of an improper motive on
behalf of the prosecution. Id.
In Simmons, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that there was no
abuse of discretion in granting a mistrial as manifest necessity was present,
even after the court gave a curative instruction. Moreover, the grant of the
mistrial did not violate the principles of double jeopardy. It is important for
Maryland practitioners to understand that improper statements, including
comments made by counsel that are known or should be known to be
inadmissible, can lead to a mistrial if such statements jeopardize a party's
right to a fair trial. Further, even after a curative instruction is given, a
mistrial can still be granted if the effectiveness of the cure is deemed to be
inadequate in the face of substantial bias.

